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We examine empirically how patent quality in terms of forward citation and 
science linkage affect the market value of a firm. We find that both indicators 
affect the market value of a firm significantly even if we extensively control 
the effects of the other major determinants of the market value, including 
R&D investment and current return on asset. In addition, the forward 
citation affects the market value more in cumulative innovation area such as 
in IT, consistent with a theoretical proposition that the value of having a 
dependent patent is larger in the industry where innovation is cumulative 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely recognized that patent quality such as the forward citation (the 
average number of citations made by subsequent patents) and the science 
linkage (the average number of cited science literature) of a patent are 
significantly related to the value of a patent. Studies by Harhoff, Scherer and 
Vopel (2003) and Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Fogarty (2002) suggest that patent 
forward citation at an individual patent level is significantly correlated with 
the assessment by the inventor of the economic or technical importance of 
his/her patent. There is also a case study which suggests that the forward 
citation of a patent is correlated significantly with the social value of the 
invention incorporated into such patent(see Trajtenberg (1990)). Moreover, 
there are recent firm level studies mainly focusing on the US firms, which 
show that the patent quality of a firm is significantly correlated with its 
market value (Deng, Lev and Narin (1999), Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 
(2000) and Hirschey and Richardson (2001, 2004)).   
One of the interesting unaddressed questions is whether patent 
quality affects the market value of a firm differently, depending on the 
characteristics of innovation at industry level. A theoretical consideration 
suggests that the value of having a dependent patent would be larger in the 
industry where innovation is cumulative among firms, since a patent with 
the same number of dependent patents will control a larger number of 
patents indirectly in such industry. This suggests that the forward citation of 
the patents of a firm has a stronger effect on its market value in the industry 
where innovation is more cumulative. On the other hand, the science linkage  3
of the patents of a firm may not have a similar amplified effect in the 
industry where science linkage is generally high, since high science linkage 
of an industry does not indicate high appropriation possibility for the patents 
with high science linkage. This paper analyzes whether we can find 
empirical evidence for these differential effects of patent quality on the 
market value of a firm, depending on the nature of innovation of the industry, 
based on the Japanese firm level data. Such inquiry would contribute to our 
understanding of the mechanism by which patent quality affects the value of 
a firm. 
Our study can also be distinguished from existing studies on the 
linkage between patent quality and market value in the extent to which it 
controls the effects of the major determinants of the market value of a firm 
other than patent quality, including R&D investment, the number and the 
degree of diversification of the patent portfolio of a firm, the current 
accounting return on asset, and industry by year exogenous changes. The 
past studies, including Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2000) and Hirschey and 
Richardson (2001, 2004), control only some of these variables, and in 
particular do not control the effects of industry by year exogenous changes.  
Controlling these factors is crucial to avoid finding spurious correlation 
between patent quality measures and market value. For an example, 
improved technological opportunities of an industry would increase the 
market value of a firm belonging to the industry as well as the forward 
citation frequency and science linkage of the firm.   
  For this objective, we have matched the patent information from the  4
US patent database developed by Chi research 1and the business and 
financial information of the Japanese firms listed in the Japanese stock 
exchanges available from NEEDS (Nikkei Economic Electronic Database 
System) and the stock price information of the World scope. The matching 
has enabled us to develop the balanced panel database covering 221 firms for 
three periods from 1988-1992, 1993-1997, and 1998-2002. The database 
covers a relatively small share (12 %) of the number of the listed firms in 
manufacturing, utilities (telecommunications, electricity and gas) and 
electronics-related wholesale trading. However, these firms account for 78 % 
of the sum of the R&D reported by the listed firms in these sectors, and 40 % 
of the total industrial R&D in Japan. Thus, we may say the sample covers 
substantially the R&D performing large firms in Japan (see Table 1 in 
section 2 for industry distribution of our sample firms). 
The organization of the rest of the paper is the following. In section 2, 
we present analytical framework and two major hypotheses to be tested. In 
section 3 we describe the econometric specification for testing these 
hypotheses, the construction of the variables as well as estimation methods, 
and in section 4 we present the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Patent quality, cumulative innovation and market value: analytical 
framework and hypotheses 
We extend the following conventional specification of the market value of a 
firm, which is due to Griliches (1981) and extensively used thereafter ( see  5
Hall (1999) for a comprehensive review of the literature2):  
) ( IK K V λ θ + =                               ( 1 )  
where K is the value of the tangible capital stock of a firm, IK is the value of 
the intangible capital stock, λ is the relative shadow price of the intangible 
asset, andθ represents the divergence between the market value of a firm 
and the sum of its tangible and intangible capital stocks. θ  is supposed to 
reflect the market power or the competitive advantage of a firm. We assume 
that the quality and the size of the patent portfolio of a firm affect this 
parameterθ . There are two determinants  θ : how advanced the proprietary 
technology of a firm is relative to the existing technology (we call it backward 
protection  provided by patent protection) and how long it will remain 
un-superceded by competing technologies (we call it forward protection 
provided by patent protection). Denoting the extent of the current 
technological advantage by φ  (the parameter of backward protection) and 
the expected length of such advantage by T (the parameter of forward 
protection), we can have the following specification.     
  φ θ T + =1                                    ( 2 )  
Here  φ T  represents the degree of divergence from a competitive situation  6
and represents the quality of R&D investment. 
Defining Tobin’s q as the market value relative to the tangible capital 
stock ( K V q / = ), we have 
) / 1 ( K IK q λ θ + =                              ( 3 )  
Taking the logarithms of both sides, and assuming that both  φ T and 
K IK / λ are significantly less than 1, we have the following basic equation for 
our empirical analysis: 
K IK T K V q / ) / ln( ln λ φ + ≅ = çççççç   ç (4)ççç 
  Equation (4) suggests that the market value of a firm is high when its 
patent portfolio is of high quality (that is, high  φ T ) for a given level of R&D 
investment due to either or both of more backward protection and more 
forward protection. We postulate that  φ T  increases with both the forward 
citation and the science linkage of the patents of a firm. Both measures of 
patent quality would indicate that such firm has significant inventions in its 
patent portfolio in terms of large  φ , T or both. Note that a firm with high  φ  
is likely to have large T, since a larger technological advantage gained today 
implies more time for being caught-up. In addition, high forward citation 
may directly indicate strong forward protection, since the future patents by  7
other firms are more likely to be dependent on the patent portfolio of the firm. 
Thus, we have the following hypothesis for empirical testing.   
 
Hypothesis 1 
Both the number of the forward citations of the patent portfolio of a firm and 
its science linkage frequency enhance the market value of a firm for a given 
level of R&D investment, to the extent that they indicate both or either of 
stronger forward protection and stronger backward protection.   
 
Let us turn to the interaction between patent quality and the nature 
of innovation at industry level. In the industry where innovation is 
cumulative among firms, forward citation is likely to be high for the industry 
as a whole. Indeed, IT industry (computers & peripherals, electronics, 
semiconductors and telecommunications) has high forward citations, as seen 
in Table 1. A patent in computer industry or in telecommunications industry 
is cited by the subsequent patents almost three times more than a patent in 
pharmaceutical industry. In the industry with strong cumulative nature of 
innovation, a patent with the same number of dependent patents can control  8
a larger number of patents indirectly. As a result, we can expect that a highly 
cited patent tends to be more valued in such industry than in the rest. 
Assuming that forward citation reflects partly the dependency relationship, 
we can then postulate that a firm with a given amount of forward citation 
can enjoy stronger forward protection in the industry with high average 
forward citation and therefore higher market value (See appendix 1 for more 
details).  
                  ( T a b l e 1 )  
On the other hand, such complementary relationship between a firm 
level variable and an industry level variable may not hold for science linkage. 
Pharmaceutical and food industries have the highest science linkage 
indicators, with a patent in pharmaceutical industry having the number of 
science references 15 times more than a patent in automobile industry (see 
Table 1). High science linkage of an industry, however, does not enable the 
patent of a given science linkage to enjoy more forward protection in such 
industry. In fact, the quite opposite may be true, since more radical 
innovations supplanting the incumbent may be more likely to happen in 
such industry.  In summary, we have the following proposition on how 
patent quality indicators affect market value of a firm, dependent on the 
forward citation and science linkage of the patents in each industry: 
  9
Hypothesis 2 
The number of the forward citations of the patent portfolio of a firm has a 
larger effect on its market value in the industry with high average forward 
citation, due to the stronger forward protection in such industry, while the 
number of its science linkage may not have such interactive effect in the 
industry with high science linkage. 
 
3. Specification, construction of basic variables and estimation methods   
We use the following specifications, corresponding to equation (4), the one 
without the interaction terms between firm level and industry level patent 
variables and the one with such interaction terms: 
+ + + + + + + = t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i adva sci cits spats rda roa asset q , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 , ) ( ) 1 (ln ) 1 (ln ) (ln ) ( ) ln( ln β β β β β β β  
t i l t i l t i l l t i l dDummies IndByPerio inva land debtasset , , 9 , , 8 , . 7 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ε α β β β + + + + + − − − ∑ ∑ ∑  (5) 
and  
t i k t i t i t i t i t i t i cits cit cits spats rda roa asset q , 2 , 4 , 1 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 , ) 1 (ln ) ( ) 1 (ln ) (ln ) ( ) ln( ln × + + + + + = β β β β β β  
+ + × + + t i t i k t i avda sci sci sci , 6 , 1 , 5 , 1 , 5 ) ( ) 1 (ln ) ( ) 1 (ln β β β
t i l t i l t i l l t i l dDummies IndByPerio inva land debtasset , , 9 , , 8 , . 7 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ε α β β β + + + + + − − − ∑ ∑ ∑  (6) 
Here, i indicates a firm and t indicates a period, and  t i, ε is the error term. 
The dependent variable (lnq)i,t is the logarithm of Tobin’ q which is 
defined as the ratio of the market value relative to the book value of  firm i 
in period t: (book value of the debt+ market capitalization of equity)/book  10
value of the asset. We measure it for each firm at the end of the last year of 
three five-year periods (1998-1992, 1993-1997 and 1998-2002).   
Let us move to independent variables. The logarithm of the value of 
tangible assets ( ) ln(asset i,t) controls the economy of scale. Its coefficient is 
positive if economy of scale exits. The variables (rda)i,t and (adva)i,t are 
respectively the R&D asset ratio and the advertisement asset ratio of a firm, 
and we expect positive coefficients for these variables. We use four patent 
based variables (spats, cits,  sci, and focus), which are the flow variables 
based on the US patents granted in each period. Given the significant 
variation of the economic significance of an individual patent across 
industries (as shown in Table 1, the number of US patents per R&D is more 
than 10 times larger for a firm in instrument industry than for a firm in 
pharmaceutical industry), we use the normalized number of patents as a 
variable representing the size of patent portfolio in each period. In particular, 
we use the share of the number of the patents granted to a firm (spats)i,t in 
the entire Chi database. More precisely, it is the average of the shares of the 
US patents granted to each firm in 30 technology areas for a given period, 
with the weight being the number of the patents held by a firm in each 
technology area. We expect a positive coefficient for spats, since the 
appropriability of R&D investments are enhanced by more patents.   
The variable (cits) i,t indicates the normalized number of forward 
citations made by the subsequent US patents up to the end of 2002 with 
respect to the patents granted to firm i in period t3, after being adjusted for 
the biases due to the truncation of the length of citing period for recent  11
periods. It is important to note that the fact that the forward citation 
frequency per patent for the patents granted in the first period (1988-1992) 
is significantly larger than that for the patents granted in the last period 
(1988-2002) does not mean that the quality of the patent deteriorated over 
time. The variable cits adjusts the number of citations per patent (cit) in 
period t, based on the ratio of the average number of citations per patent 
granted in the period from 1983 to 1988 and that granted in period t in each 
technology area. More specifically, it is given by the following formula: 
) / )( / )( ( , , 1988 , , , , i j i t j j
j
t j i t i npat npat cit cit cit cits ∑ =                       ( 7 )  
Here,  t j i cit , ,   is the average number of forward citations per patent of firm i in 
technology area j out of 30 technology areas in period t (See Appendix 1 for 
technology classification),  t j cit ,   is the average number of forward citations of 
the patents granted to all firms (including non-Japanese firms) in the CHI 
database which have at lease one patent in technology area j. On the other 
hand, sci indicates the average science linkage per patent of each firm, which 
is given by the average number of (backward) citations of science papers by 
the US patents granted to a firm (science linkage indicator constructed by 
Chi research)4. We expect positive coefficients for these variables: cits and 
sci. 
  In order to test hypothesis 2, we will implement the following two 
estimations. First we will estimate above equation (6), in which the effects of 
forward citation and science linkage of a firm can depend on industry 
variables of these measures. Here,  k cit  is the average number of forward  12
citations of industry k to which firm i  belongs, and  k sci  is the average 
science linkage of industry k in a logarithmic term, to which firm i belongs. 
We use the Japanese industry values for the period from 1993 to 1997. We 
expect that  2 , 4 β   has a positive coefficient, given the complementary 
relationship between the forward citation at firm level and the forward 
citation at industry level (see hypothesis 2). Second, we will estimate above 
equation (5) focusing on IT industry (computers & peripherals, electronics, 
semiconductors and telecommunications) and pharmaceutical and food 
industry. We expect that the forward citation has a larger coefficient in the 
IT industry which has high average forward citation (see Table 1).   
The variable focus is the HHI of the patent portfolio. It is defined as 
the sum of the squared shares of each of 30 technology areas in terms of the 
numbers of patents in, which is a broad classifications of technology (see 
appendix 1), in the total patents granted to a firm for a given period. Since 
we control the quality of the patents held by a firm, the focus variable is 
meant to measure the effect of focusing (or conversely diversification) of 
research or business in appropriating the research results.   
Since all of these variables on the intangible assets (rda, adva and 
the patent based variables) refer to the investments in the current period, we 
use the return on asset (roa) i,t as an additional explanatory variable, which 
would reflect the effects of the investments on intangible assets made in the 
past. In addition we expect that roa could substantially control the effects of 
firm level missing variables (see the following discussions on estimation 
strategy), including firm fixed effects. We expect that the past investment  13
performance in intangible assets are reflected in the current return on asset, 
which determines the market value of a firm, together with the current 
performance of the investments in intangible assets. Thus, it has a positive 
coefficient. 
We introduce the following measures of the asset composition as the 
variables to control the divergence between the book value and the 
replacement value of the assets, which is very likely to vary across types of 
assets: the proportion of the investments in securities and affiliated 
companies (inva =financial investments, including investments in 
subsidiaries/total assets), the proportion of land (land =land/total assets), 
and debt asset ratio (debtasset). These balance sheet variables represent the 
information of the fiscal year just before the last year of three five-year 
periods, that is, the year which mainly ends on the march 31st of 1992, 1997, 
and 2002. We also introduce industry by time dummies to control the 
differentials of industry level demand growth and technological 
opportunities as well as the effects of macroeconomic changes over time. It is 
important to control them since R&D and market value move together in 
responding to the variations of these industry level missing variables and to 
macroeconomic shocks.   
We also estimate an equation, using the return on asset (roa) as a 
dependent variable instead of Tobin’ q, in order to check the robustness of our 
findings with respect to the two hypotheses. This specification evaluates the 
effects of patent quality on the accounting profitability of a firm. It is 
important to note that since R&D investment takes time for its effect to be  14
realized while it is immediately expensed, we may have a negative coefficient 
of rda in roa equation. In addition, we also estimate the following market 
value equation using the unadjusted forward citation variable while allowing 
the coefficient of cit to vary over time. The logarithm of the Tobin’s q is then 
specified as follows: 
+ + + + = t i t i t i t i t i spats rda roa asset q , 3 , 2 , 1 , 0 , ) (ln ) ( ) ln( ln β β β β  
+ + + + + t i t i t i t i t i adva sci cit y cit y cit y , 6 , 5 , 3 , 4 , 2 , 4 , 1 , 4 ) ( ) 1 (ln ) 2002 ( ) 1997 ( ) 1992 ( β β β β β
t i l t i l t i l l t i l dDummies IndByPerio inva land debtasset , , 9 , , 8 , . 7 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ε α β β β + + + + + − − − ∑ ∑ ∑  (8) 
Here  cit y1992  takes the value of cit for the first period (1988-1992) and zero 
for the other two periods.  cit y1997  and  cit y2002   are similarly defined.   
  We use pool estimation as our preferred estimation, although we 
show the results of random-effects estimation as well as within (or fixed 
effects) estimation (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2000) and Hirschey and 
Richardson (2001, 2004) also use pool estimations). There are two important 
sources of estimation biases for the above specifications. One is errors in 
variables. We expect that our indicators of the quality of patent are very 
noisy measures of true quality. Within (fixed-effects) estimation tends to 
amplify the impacts of errors in variables by reducing the variation of 
independent variables significantly, so that it causes the downward bias in 
estimation. Between estimation, on the other hand, reduces the effects of the 
errors in variables since it is based on the averages of the observations over 
time. The second source of estimation biases is a potential bias due to the 
correlation between a firm level missing variable and independent variables.  15
Within (firm fixed-effects) estimation can avoid the biases due to the 
presence of such correlation, while between estimation is subject to such bias. 
The pool estimation and random effects estimation, being the averages of 
within estimation and between estimation, balances these considerations. 
The pool estimation has a smaller weight on within estimation and is more 
efficient when firm fixed effects are negligible. The fact that our 
specifications extensively control firm level effects (for an example, the effect 
of managerial capability on profitability of a firm could be significantly 
captured by the return on asset roa) may provide a justification for us to use 
the pool estimation as our  preferred  estimation.   
  Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the key variables for the 
US patents granted during period from 1993 to 1997 (see Table Appendix_2 
for entire summary statistics). Figure 1 shows that there exist positive 
correlations between two measures of patent quality and the market value 
for the Japanese firms. Tobin’s q  rises with forward citation and science 
linkage. The questions we address econometrically in next section are to 
analyze whether such correlation survives, controlling the other major 
determinants of the market value of firms, and whether their effects differ 
depending on whether innovations are cumulative or science-based.   
                      ( F i g u r e   1 )   
 
4. Estimation results 
Table 2 and 3 show the main estimation results, while Appendix Table A-3 
presents the results of the supplementary regressions for robustness checks.  16
All estimations have the logarithm of Tobin’s q as a dependent variable, 
except for estimations 8 and 9 which have roa as a dependent variable. All 
estimations use the aggregate balanced panel data, except for estimation 6 
using the sub-sample of IT industry and for estimation 7 using that of 
pharmaceutical and food industry (which has the highest science linkage). 
We exclude the upper 5% and the lower 5% of the sample in terms of Tobin’q 
in estimation 2 in the appendix A-3 to see whether the results are not driven 
by a small number of outliers. We use the un-balanced panel data in 
estimation 3 in the appendix A-3.   
First, let us take a look at the estimations based on the aggregate 
sample in Table 2. The first three estimations provide basic results, based on 
pool or random effect estimations, while estimation 4 provides the result of 
estimation without the accounting profitability (roa) as an explanatory 
variable. Pool and random effects estimations produced very similar 
coefficient estimates. We start with the patent quality variables. The forward 
citation (ln1cits) has a positive and significant coefficient (5% level) in 
estimation 1, even controlling the other major determinants of market value 
of a firm, including roa. The estimated coefficient of estimation 1 suggests 
that 10% increase of forward citation results in about 0.9 % improvement of 
the market value of a firm. Estimation 2 and 3 suggest that, once the 
forward citation interacted with the industry level forward citation 
(citind*ln1cits) is introduced, only the latter term has a positive coefficient 
(5% or 1% level). This implies that forward citation has a significantly larger 
effect in the industry with high forward citation. According to the coefficients  17
in estimation 2, the marginal increase of forward citation has the effect 
amounting to 0.35 (=0.066*8.90-0.242) in telecommunications sector, while it 
has only 0.12 (=0.066*5.56-0.242) in automobile industry, thus three times 
difference between the industry with high forward citation and that with low 
forward citation. If we drop the roa variable, the significance of these 
variables increases, as shown in estimation 4.   
Science linkage (sci) is also significant (5% level) in pool estimation 1, 
according to which 10% improvement of science linkage results in 0.8% 
improvement of the market value of a firm. On the other hand, the 
interaction term between the firm level value and the industry level value 
(sciind*ln1sci)) is not significant in both pool and random effect estimations 
(estimation 2 and 3 respectively), although it has a positive coefficient in 
both estimations. Thus, there is no strong evidence for the significance of the 
interaction term for science linkage.   
Let us turn to the rest of the variables.  They have the coefficients 
with the expected sigh, although the level of significance varies significantly 
across firms. As expected, the accounting profitability (roa) has a highly 
significant positive coefficient in all equations. R&D intensity (rda) and the 
patent share (spats) have positive coefficients, but their significance levels 
are low. The variable rda has a significance of 5% only in random effects 
estimation (estimation 3), while the patent share variable has only 10% 
significance in the same estimation. This low significance of the number of 
patents in market value equation seems to be partly due to multi-colinearity 
but may also indicate the presence of a strongly diminishing return from the  18
number of patents in enhancing the appropriability of R&D5.  
Advertisement investment (adva) has a positive coefficient but not 
significant, although it becomes significant if we drop the accounting 
profitability roa (See estimation 4). The size of the estimated coefficient is 
much lower than for R&D intensity in estimations 1 to 3, which may be 
explained by the fact that advertisement investment may have more a 
near-term effect on the market value of a firm than R&D investment, so that 
its effect is more caught by the roa variable. Finally, focus variable (lnfocus) 
does not have a significant coefficient in any market value equation, 
although it has a positive coefficient and the size of coefficient becomes 
larger when roa variable is dropped (see estimation 4).  The focus of R&D 
has a favorable effect on the accounting profitability, controlling firm size 
among others (estimations 8 and 9).   
Let us move to the results of within estimation (see estimation 5 in 
Table 2). Within estimation removes the estimation bias due to any 
remaining firm fixed effect which is not controlled by roa variable, while it 
tends to worsen the errors in variables problem. As for the patent quality 
variables, the coefficients of the forward citation variables (ln1cits  and 
citind*ln1cits) are not much affected, although they become insignificant 
(compare estimations 2 and 5).  The coefficients of the science linkage 
variables, on the other hand, declined further. On the other hand, roa 
remains highly significant, and rda and spats variables increased their 
significance.  
We then turn to the estimation results in Table 3. Estimations 6 focus  19
on IT industry and estimation 7 on pharmaceutical and food industries. The 
estimated coefficient of forward citation for IT industry, which is significant 
at 10% level. The coefficient of cits is 0.235 for IT industry (estimation 6 in 
Table 3), while it is 0.093 for the aggregate sample (estimation 1 in Table 2). 
That is, a firm with a highly cited patent can enhance its market value 
significantly more in IT industry. That is, forward citation matters more in 
cumulative technology area, consistent with our hypothesis.   
                 ( T a b l e   3 )  
On the other hand, science linkage is no more significant in affecting 
the market value of a firm in pharmaceutical and food industry. The size of 
the coefficient for ln1sci estimated for the sub-sample of pharmaceutical and 
food industry (although not significant) is similar to that for the aggregate 
sample (compare estimation 1 and 7). In addition, the share of the patents 
granted (spats) has a positive coefficient (significant at 10%) in the 
pharmaceutical and food industry (see estimation 7), unlike the finding to 
the contrary based on the aggregate sample (see estimation 1). R&D itself 
(rda) is significant for this subset of industry. These findings suggest that a 
patent has a significantly higher value in this industry.   
Estimations 8 to 9 use the accounting rate of return (roa) as the 
dependent variable, using the aggregate sample. The estimations results for 
forward citation variables are significantly consistent with those found for 
market value of a firm. Since the coefficient of the interaction term 
(citind*ln1cits) is  positive and significant, forward citation has a larger 
positive effect on accounting profitability of a firm in the industry with high  20
average forward citation. Science linkage is found to be not significant for 
accounting profitability (see estimation 8). The negative coefficient of rda 
may not be surprising, since R&D investment takes time for its effect to be 
realized while it is immediately expensed.   
Let us finally turn to the robustness checks, shown in Table 
Appendix-3. ç Estimation A-1 uses the un-normalized forward citation 
variable of the patents of a firm, while the equation allows the coefficient to 
vary over time. This raw forward citation variable (cit) has a positive and 
highly significant coefficient (1% or 5% level) for both as the most recent 
period (1998-2002) and for the second period (1993-1997). The science 
linkage variable has a positive and significant coefficient at 5% level. Thus, 
these results support hypothesis 1, even if we use the raw citation variable. 
Estimation A-2 in Table Appendix-3 shows that excluding the upper 5% and 
the lower 5% of the sample in terms of Tobin’q makes the forward citation 
variables (lncit  and  citindln1cits) more significant (5% and 1% level 
significance respectively). Estimation A-3 uses the sample of an unbalanced 
panel. This sample is larger, since it covers the firms which appeared only in 
the second or third period or which exited in one of these two periods, so that 
it may have sample selection problem in pool or random effects estimations. 
As shown in the table, focusing on the unbalanced panel does not 
significantly affect the results either, although the significance of the 
forward citation variables is weaker.   
 
  21
5. Conclusions and discussions 
This paper has examined whether the patent quality of a firm significantly 
affects the market value of a firm and whether the frequency of forward 
citation (by subsequent patents) matters more in the industry where 
innovation is cumulative. We have two major findings. First, we have found 
that both forward citation and science linkage of the patents granted to a 
firm significantly increases its market value of the Japanese firms, even if 
we extensively control the effects of the other major determinants of market 
value. They include R&D and advertisement investments, the current return 
on asset as a variable representing firm level missing variables and industry 
level exogenous changes. Thus, these two patent quality variables are the 
significant indicators of the R&D quality of a firm.   
Second, we have found that the forward citation of the patents of a 
firm affects its market value more in the industry where innovation is 
cumulative among firms. This finding is consistent with a theoretical 
proposition that the value of having a dependent patent is larger in the 
industry where innovation is cumulative among firms. On the other hand, 
science linkage of a patent does not have a similar amplified effect in the 
industry where science linkage is generally high. Such difference between 
forward citation and science linkage may not be surprising, given that a 
patent with high science linkage does not necessarily imply that such patent 
enables more appropriation of the return from the follow-up innovations, 
unlike a patent with high forward citation. Although both are the measures 
of cumulative innovation in a broad sense, science linkage mainly indicates  22
the linkage between industry research and academic research, while forward 
citation in patent terms indicates the linkage within industrial research.    23
Appendix 1.  A simple model of the value of a patent in the industry of 
cumulative innovation with tree structure 
Let us consider the following three-period model of innovation competition. 
Initially the patent of firm A has value  φ , which represents the degree of the 
divergence from the competitive situation (see equation (2) in the main text). 
We ignore discounting. A competing invention occurs in the end of the first 
two periods. Such invention may be dependent directly or indirectly on the 
patent of firm A or it may be independent from the patent of firm A. We 
assume that the emergence of the dependent patent changes the value of the 
patent of firm A by a factor  ρ (>0) and the emergence of an independent 
patent makes it totally obsolete. In addition, the patent of firm A loses its 
exclusive right in the end of the third period due to the statutory limitation 
on the patent term.   
We assume that the probability that the patent of firm A becomes 
obsolete by an competing invention in the end of the first period declines 
with the number of the forward citations of its patent ( A cit ): 
A cit δ − =1 Pr1 .                           ( a . 1 )  
This reflects the fact that a patent with more forward citations is more likely 
to control the subsequent patents. When the invention in the first period is 
dependent on the patent of firm A, the firm A can sustain its market power 
after the first period, and the value of the patent changes from  φ  toρφ .  
In the second period, the patent of firm A has no value if the 
independent patent is granted in the first period. Unless, it sustains its value 
in the second period but may become obsolete due to the emergence of a new  24
independent invention in the end of the second period. For simplicity, we 
assume that the second period patent is not directly dependent on the patent 
of firm A. However, it can be indirectly dependent through its dependence on 
the first period patent which is dependent on the patent of firm A. In such 
case, the patent of firm A still sustains its value in the third period. We 
assume that the probability that the second period invention is independent 
of the first period patent declines with the average number of the forward 
citations of the industry patents: 
ind cit δ − =1 Pr2                             ( a . 2 )  
  Given these assumptions, the value of the patent of firm A expected 
at the beginning of the first period is given by the sum of the expected values 
of the following three contingencies: the patent of firm A has its value for one 
period, two periods or three periods: 
) Pr 1 )( Pr 1 )( 1 ( Pr ) Pr 1 )( 1 ( Pr 2 1
2
2 1 1 − − + + + − + + = ρ ρ φ ρ φ φ y  
} ) ( 1 {
2
ind A A cit cit cit ρδ ρδ φ + + =                   ( a . 3 )  
Thus, the derivate of the patent value with respect to its forward citation is 
given by   
} ) ( { ) ( /
2
ind A cit cit y ρδ ρδ φ + = ∂ ∂                         ( a . 4 )  
That is, the effect of forward citation on the value of the patent increases 
with the average forward citations of the industry patents.    25
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1  See Narin (2000) for an explanation of the database. It covers the major patentees 
of the US patents.   
2  See Nagaoka (2004) for a non-conventional approach, emphasizing the non-rival 
nature of technology within a firm. 
3  Our data consist of the patent data in 30 technology areas. We calculated the average 
forward citation for each firm for a given period based on the number of patents granted 
in each technology area. 
4  See Branstetter (2004) for an analysis of the causes of the recent rise of science 
linkage and Meyer (2000) for various meanings of the science paper references.   
5  This low significance of the number of patents is not consistent with the finding of 
Hall et al. (2000) for the US firms, although it is consistent with Hirschey et al. (2001). 
The difference between our study and Hall et al. (2000) may be accounted for by our 
better control of exogenous and firm level factors in our study, and by the difference of 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Technology classification Industry classification
1 Agriculture Industry code Industry
2 Oil & Gas, Mining 1 COMP Computers
3 Power Generation & Distribution 2 ELTR Electronics
4 Food & Tobacco 3 SEMI Semiconductors
5 Textiles & Apparel 4 TCOM Telecommunicati
ons
6 Wood & Paper 5 ELEC Electrical
7C h e m i c a l s 6I N S T Instrument. &
Optical
8 Pharmaceuticals 7 MACH Machinery
9 Biotechnology 8 AUTO Automotive
10 Medical Equipment 9 CHEM Chemicals
11 Medical Electronics 10 CONS Consumer
Products
12 Plastics, Polymers, & Rubber 11 ENGY Energy
13 Glass, Clay, & Cement 12 FOOD Food, Bev. &
Tobacco
14 Primary Metals 13 FORP Forest & Paper
Prods.
15 Fabricated Metals 14 HLTH Health Care
16 Industrial Machinery & Tools 15 MATL Materials
17 Industrial Process Equipment 16 METL Metals
18 Office Equipment & Cameras 17 PHAR Pharmaceuticals
19 Heating, Ventilation, Refrigeration 18 TEXT Textiles
20 Misc. Machinery
21 Computers & Peripherals
22 Telecommunications
23 Semiconductors & Electronics
24 Measurement & Control Equipment
25 Electrical Appliances & Components
26 Motor Vehicles & Parts




Note. No firm in aerospace,biotechnology,engrng.,
oil field svcs. industries exists in our sample. 
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